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Abstract 
Please insert an abstract of 100 to 200 words  
The ruling of the European Court of Justice in the anti-doping case of Meca Medina 
v. The Commission has important implications for athletes, domestic governing 
bodies, international federations and supra-national actors such as WADA and the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport. Meca-Medina has been criticised as an unwelcome 
interference by the courts in the legitimate activities of sporting organisations, but 
after Bosman it was fanciful to argue that those organisations should be ‘above the 
law’ and the courts should have no jurisdiction over their activities. That said, there is 
a stark difference between the courts having jurisdiction over sports’ decisions and 
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being willing to overturn them - the courts have been, and remain, willing to defer to 
the expertise of sporting organisations. However, the ECJ’s ruling in MOTOE 
confirms that the courts will intervene in appropriate circumstances. In order to avoid 
sanction on competition law grounds sports organisations must thus be able to justify 
their provisions on (for example) what is an unacceptable level of nandrolone, show 
that athletes’ fundamental rights such as the right to a fair hearing have been 
respected, and ensure that any sanctions imposed upon athletes who fall foul of 
doping regulations are proportionate to the offence committed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: European Union; competition law; undertaking; g; dominant position; 
abuse; sport; doping  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This paper seeks to outline the implications for anti-doping organisations, athletes 
and other sporting stakeholders of the European Court of Justice’s decision in Meca-
Medina v The Commission [2006] ECR I-6991, which concerns the relationship 
between the putative independence of sporting organisations and the strictures of 
European competition law. Meca-Medina was the first occasion on which any sports-
related dispute had been scrutinised by the ECJ from the perspective of European 
competition law rather than free movement law, and while the court did not interfere 
with the doping control regime or the sanctions that had been imposed under its 
terms, its approach to the issues raised has many implications for sports governing 
bodies that are either based within the European union Union or which take action 
that impact upon the activities either of EU citizens or of undertakings that are based 
within it – which encompasses virtually every global sports organisation. These 
implications are not limited to doping regulations, but extend to the activities of any 
sports undertaking which might act in a manner that gives rise to competition law 
concerns by virtue of its impact on other actors’ economic activities. 
 The paper discusses the background to the case, the rulings of the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport that preceded the European Ccourt’s intervention and the 
judgments of the European Ccourt in its various guises. It tries to offer advice to 
sporting organisations that might feel the need to reappraise their anti-doping or 
other rules in the light of the judgment and suggests that while sporting organisations 
are right to be concerned about the implications of Meca-Medina, it is a decision that 
can be viewed quite positively by all stakeholders and actually has the potential to be 
‘good for sport’. 
 
The CAS Ruling 
In August 1999 two long-distance swimmers, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen, 
were suspended from competition for a period of four years by FINA (Fédération 
Internationale de Natation, the international governing body for swimming) for a first 
doping offence in respect of positive tests for norandrosterone (a metabolite of, and 
thus a ‘related substance’ to nandrolone) they had returned at a world championship 
long-distance race held in Brazil in January of that year. The swimmers had finished 
first and second at that event, and as such had automatically been selected for 
testing in accordance with FINA’s provision. Following their suspension by FINA the 
athletes invoked their right (under FINA’s rRules) to appeal that decision to the Court 
of Arbitration for Sport; that appeal was heard in February 2000 and, in accordance 
with Rule 51 of the CAS Code then in force, it took the form of a hearing de novo. 
That meant the CAS pPanel which heard the appeal was not limited to 
reconsideration of the evidence that had been adduced before FINA’s own 
disciplinary processes and the parties were not limited to simply revisiting the 
arguments that had been previously advanced – evidence and arguments that had 
not been put forward before the FINA panel could be adduced before CAS.  
It is evident from the CAS determination that testing for nandrolone use has 
been consistently problematic. The practicalities of nandrolone testing changed as a 
consequence of improved understanding of its ability to be produced endogenously 
and its potential to form in the course of an actual urine test sample. This improved 
understanding of nandrolone production, discussed in Bernhard v. ITU, CAS 
1998/222, had a far-reaching effect on testing procedures because it meant that 
doping organisations had to respond to what science had revealed. The evidence 
that a number of freely-available supplements contained traces of nandrolone 
(Foschi, 2006, p.479) confused matters still further, so much so that “athletes who 
were never able to explain their positive analytical findings may wish to reopen their 
cases and attempt to have their stored sample retested” (McLaren, 2006, p.9). One 
can thus understand the complexity of the issues with which CAS, and thereafter the 
European courts, had to engage. CAS, in dispensing with the “grey area” concept 
that had been utilised in earlier decisions such as Mason, Bouras, and Bernhard, 
held that the permissible maximum level of nandrolone would be no more than 
2ng/mlL. This figure was comfortably in excess of any recorded naturally-occurring 
levels and clearly gave the benefit of any doubt to the athletes concerned, but the 
corollary was that any athlete whose readings exceeded that level would face an 
onerous task in advancing an innocent explanation for those readings.  
CAS heard that, because nandrolone could be produced endogenously, the level of 
nandrolone or nandrolone metabolytes that a sample had to reveal before a doping 
offence would be regarded as having been committed had to incorporate a ‘safe 
margin’ in order to protect those athletes who naturally produced high levels. 
Accordingly, a doping offence for endogenous norandrosterone was only deemed to 
have prima facie occurred if more than 2 ng/ml was present (this figure being more 
than twenty times the highest level of endogenous production ever recorded in the 
scientific literature). David Meca-Medina’s A and B samples recorded levels of 14.2 
ng/ml and 15.3 ng/ml respectively; Igor Majcen’s levels were 3.6 ng/ml and 3.1 ng/ml 
respectively (TAS 99/A/234, 235 para 2), and in accordance with FINA’s anti-doping 
rules (the current version of which may be found in Article DC 3 of its doping control 
rules) the presence of the banned substance thus “shift(ed) to the athlete/competitor 
the burden of establishing why he should not be sanctioned to the full extent 
provided for under (the rules)” (paraTAS 99/A/234, 235 para 3.4):. 
 
She will do this only by showing ‘clearly’ both how the prohibited 
substance got into his/her body and that there was no negligence on his 
or her part in allowing it to do so. The adverb ‘clearly’ designedly imports 
in our view a less stringent standard than the ordinary common law 
criminal standard of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ but a more stringent one 
than the ordinary common civil law standard ‘on the balance of 
probability’. The perceptible purpose is to prevent a competitor from 
simply (and sufficiently) asserting ignorance of how such substance got 
into his/her body (para 4.7). 
 
The athletes advanced several grounds for contending that no doping offence had 
been committed and that the ban imposed by FINA should be rescinded. 
Specifically, they questioned the collection and custody of their urine samples, the 
standard of proof that was applicable in doping cases and whether the substance in 
question was banned at all. They also argued that, if a banned substance had 
indeed been found in their urine samples, its presence was due to the innocent 
ingestion of pork offal which contained that substance and they could thus ‘clearly’ 
show that they were not responsible. If all else failed, they would argue that a four-
year ban for a first offence was disproportionate and contrary to the applicable 
(Swiss) law (para 6.1).  
The arguments advanced to support the contention that no offence had been 
committed were dealt with in short order: the athletes had failed to show any 
anomalies with the collection, custody and transportation procedures, and while 
precursors of nandrolone had only been explicitly added to FINA’s list of banned 
substances some months after these athletes’ failed tests, they had previously been 
prohibited as ‘related substances’ and bans imposed in respect of them under that 
classification had been considered by CAS on previous occasions (see for example 
CAS 98/212 UCI v FCI and CAS 98/222 B v ITU).  
However, the arguments in favour of the ‘innocent ingestion’ hypothesis 
caused more difficulty for the PpPanel. Although the possibility that their high 
readings were a result of eating meat products from animals which had been injected 
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with nandrolone was regarded as merely ‘theoretical’, CAS was troubled by the 
argument that, in the run-up to the competition, the applicants had eaten sarapatel (a 
local speciality made of uncastrated boars’ meat) on several occasions at the 
restaurant’s daily buffet and that their failed tests were either a direct consequence 
of the practice of injecting growth-enhancing hormones (such as nandrolone) into 
boars; or because endogenous nandrolone could be present in non-castrated boars 
in sufficiently high levels to cause the positive tests (CAS 99/A/234, para 10). CAS 
resolved the matter by asserting that, even if all the available scientific and 
circumstantial evidence was interpreted in the manner most favourable to the 
athletes, the ‘innocent ingestion’ hypotheses remained unverified and thus could not 
amount to evidence that ‘clearly’ showed the athletes’ lack of culpability as the FINA 
rules required. Finally, while CAS accepted that a two-year ban was often the 
minimum sanction that governing bodies imposed for such offences it was open to 
FINA to have a higher sanction; neither CAS, the Swiss courts nor other domestic 
courts that have been charged with reviewing doping penalties have regarded such 
penalties as disproportionate (see for example Wilander v Tobin (1997) 2 CMLR 
348). Accordingly, the athletes’ appeals failed on all grounds. 
Four months after the CAS ruling a series of scientific tests were carried out 
(at the swimmers’ behest) on three volunteers who ate a meal prepared from the 
meat of uncastrated boars. The results led to speculation that such meals could 
indeed result in high levels of endogenous production of nandrolone metabolites 
among consumers. FINA and the athletes agreed that those results merited further 
examination, and thus the matter was referred back to CAS so that the same three-
member panel could consider whether the decision should be revised on the basis 
that the new scientific evidence meant the panel could now be ‘reasonably satisfied’ 
that the source of the finding of nandrolone metabolites might have been the 
consumption of meat from uncastrated boars.  
In the event, CAS said that while it was “in the realm of possibility” that the 
metabolites in the athletes’ urine “could have had the same source as the results of 
the three volunteers in the…experiment…that possibility has not reached the level 
required by the arbitration agreement of ‘reasonable satisfaction’” (para 6.8). It 
reached that conclusion having considered, inter alia, the massive difference 
between the swimmers’ ng/ml readings and the much lower ones of the volunteers, 
which had been in the region of 6 ng/ml; the fact that at least 18 hours had elapsed 
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between the swimmers’ ingesting the meat and their positive sample being given (as 
opposed to 15 hours in the case of the volunteers’ much lower readings (para 6.6)); 
that there were several other variables that made it impossible to ‘read across’ 
between the two sets of results; that other features of the swimmers’ readings were 
“the hallmark of oral ingestion of (a) prohibited substance” (para 6.9); and that 
sarapatel “cannot in (the Panel’s) view sensibly have been a diet of choice for an 
athlete shortly before competition” (para 7.6). However, CAS said it was 
“sympathetic to the proposition that a four years’ suspension is very severe in case 
of a first offence” (para 9.1), and while it had no grounds for finding that its length 
was contrary to the applicable Swiss law (under which sports governing bodies enjoy 
considerable autonomy in disciplinary matters (Wang v FINA 5P 83/1999)), it did 
note that at the time many international sports federations stipulated a two-year ban 
for a first offence. It thus reduced the swimmers’ ban to one of two years in order to 
accord with the terms of the Olympic Antidoping Code, which had come into force in 
January 2000 (para 9.12). 
 
Proceedings before the Commission and the Court of First Instance 
In Meca-Medina the Community created an indirect anti-doping policy through the 
jurisprudence of the European courts. This was accomplished via the application of 
European competition law (especially the provisions formerly laid down in Articles 81 
and 82 EC Treaty and now to be found in Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty of the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, the Lisbon Treaty)) to the contentious 
practices of a sporting body. In the wake of the 1998 Festina tour, doping had 
become an area in which the EU rapidly developed both interest and influence even 
though there was no mention of sport in the EC Treaty and it thus lacked the 
competence to take direct action in the area (Vermeersch, 2006, p.1). However 
Meca-Medina did not concern the Community’s nascent anti-doping influence but the 
legality of the regulations of the IOC, a private body whose rules had an inherent 
public context and (according to the athletes) fell within scope of the EC Treaty 
because its monopoly powers had been used in a way which prevented them from 
participating in their chosen economic activity. As was recognised in Meca-Medina, 
however, the complexity of the rules was compounded by the nature of the 
substance allegedly ingested by the swimmers: because nandrolone is a naturally-
occurring substance and people naturally produce different amounts of it there is a 
clear difficulty in establishing with the requisite degree of certainty that a doping 
offence has been committed. The decision by CAS is notable for its detailed analysis 
of the nandrolone intake of Meca-Medina and Majcen, its performance-enhancing 
potential and the difficulties in establishing a reliable ‘test’ for it, and this must have 
been helpful for the European courts in their attempts to understand the scientific 
basis of nandrolone testing.  
The CAS decision was followed by a joint complaint to the European 
Commission (Case COMP 38.158). This was not an appeal against the CAS ruling 
but a completely new course of action, exploring aspects of European competition 
law that could not have been explored before the CAS itself by virtue of the ex aequo 
et bono concept (a fundamental tenet of arbitration, empowering arbiters to ‘do what 
is right’ in the circumstances rather than being bound by the law, as discussed in 
CAS 2008/A/1644 Mutu v Chelsea FC). While the mere idea of the ordinary courts 
having oversight of sporting rules excites widespread disquiet within those 
organisations, it was perfectly proper for the swimmers to take this course of action. 
As a citizen of an EU member state (in Meca-Medina’s case) and of a state which 
then had an association agreement with the EU (Majcen), both could avail 
themselves of the remedies potentially afforded by European competition law once 
they had exhausted the internal appeals procedures. The fact that FINA has its seat 
in Lausanne, Switzerland rather than in an EU member state is immaterial, although 
it would be unhelpful to glibly assert that an organisation whose rules or practices 
impact upon an individual or an undertaking based within the EU is compelled to 
abide by EU law. There are many important jurisdictional issues that potentially arise 
when international sporting federation’s rules conflict with the law, but at no stage in 
Meca-Medina was it argued that the European courts did not have jurisdiction over 
the case. They clearly did have jurisdiction in the proper sense of having the power 
to entertain the application; the issue to be decided by those courts was whether 
European law did indeed afford the swimmers a remedy (Hoey and McArdle, 2008). 
The swimmers argued that the anti-doping rules adopted by the IOC and 
FINA restricted competition within the meaning of Articles 81 and 82 EC of the 
Treaty and that fixing the 2 ng/mlL limit was established by an unlawful concerted 
practice between the IOC, FINA and the testing laboratories (they also argued that 
the rules unjustifiably restricted their freedom to provide services under Article 49 as 
was). The Commission accepted that the IOC was both an undertaking and an 
association of undertakings for the purposes of competition law but “immediately 
pointed out that the rules and alleged concerted practices at stake did not come 
within the scope of ‘economic activities’….The Commission stated that anti-doping 
rules may limit the athlete’s freedom of action but are intimately linked to the proper 
conduct of sporting competition” (Colomo, 2005, para 23). That being the case, 
European law was not applicable because Article 2 of the EC Treaty provided that 
European law was only engaged if the dispute had arisen in the context of economic 
activity. 
This rejection of the swimmers’ application was appealed to the Court of First 
Instance (CFI), which seemed to “reverse the trend of giving Community law a broad 
functional reach” (Szyszczak, 2007, p.102) by agreeing with the Commission and 
affirming that the anti-doping rules did not constitute an infringement of economic 
activity at all. The CFI commented that “while it is true that high-level sport has 
become, to a great extent, an economic activity, the campaign against doping does 
not pursue any economic objective. It is intended to preserve, first, the spirit of fair 
play…and secondly, the health of athletes” (Meca-Medina v. Commission [2004] 
ECR II-3291, para 44).  
This approach was akin to the ‘sporting exception’ that had existed in the 
context of free movement law prior to Bosman and which some sporting 
organisations had lobbied for ever since: it would allow the sporting organisations 
unfettered autonomy over their anti-doping policies, to the potential detriment of 
athletes who would have no redress in European law because European law only 
becomes applicable if ‘economic activity’ can be discerned. However, that attempt to 
separate the economic aspects from the sporting aspects was flawed in several 
ways. In particular, the CFI’s approach not be reconciled with the existing 
jurisprudence on competition law, specifically the ECJ’s ruling in Wouters v ARNOA 
[2002] ECR I-1577. The CFI’s eagerness to distinguish sporting from economic ties 
had led to a very problematic analytical framework. Its approach would have been 
heartily welcomed by the anti-doping community and by sports organisations 
generally, but it was certainly not welcomed by Meca-Medina or Majcen and they 
appealed the decision to the European Court of Justice. 
 
The European Court of Justice’s Decision 
 
The ECJ’s decision did not overturn the CFI’s judgment in the sense of granting the 
swimmers the remedy they sought, but it is legally very significant because it 
corrected the errors made by the lower courts and denied sports bodies the ‘sporting 
exception’ to European law that the CFI ruling seemed to have granted them. In 
considering the CFI’s difficulty in severing anti-doping rules’ economic aspects from 
their sporting aspects the ECJ rejected the Opinion of the Advocate-General (who 
advised that the anti-doping rules were indeed ‘purely sporting’ in nature) and 
decided instead that “it is apparent that the mere fact that a rule is purely sporting in 
nature does not have the effect of removing from the scope of the Treaty the person 
engaging in the activity governed by that rule or the body which has laid it down” 
(Meca-Medina v Commission [2006] ECR I-6991, para 27). The focus thus shifted 
away from an artificial distinction between sporting rules and economic rules in 
favour of a more realistic distinction between the activities of sportsmen, and the 
rules governing these activities.  
Accordingly, the ECJ analysed the anti-doping rules in the context of the 
competition law provisions - and specifically what is now Article 101 TFEU (ex Article 
81), which prohibits agreements between undertakings and concerted practices 
“which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the internal market”. In deciding whether the agreement between 
anti-doping actors to establish these rules represented a breach of this provision, the 
Court was interested to ascertain the rules’ objectives and their effects on the 
sporting community, and thereafter to consider whether those rules were 
proportionate to the objectives thus identified. This was done by considering the anti-
doping rules in the light of the ECJ’s earlier judgment in Wouters, the application of 
which was certainly not an excursion into new territory (as Weatherill (2009, p. 84) 
indicates the Court was “simply applying general principles governing the 
interpretation of Article 81(1)”). Furthermore, the Wouters approach was not new 
even in sporting circles -. tThe DLG case [1994] ECR I-5641. (which concerned the 
application of European competition law to an agricultural co-operative’s purchasing 
rules which and underpinned the ECJ’s reasoning in Wouters) ) had been cited 
before the courts in Bosman and in Deliege [2000] ECR I-2549 (which concerned the 
selection of participants forin international judo competitions) and, and it was also 
considered by the Commission in the competition law case of Mouscron (which 
concerned UEFA’s ‘home-and-away rule’ in European club tournaments). Further, 
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Wouters itself was considered in another Commission decision, ENIC/UEFA Com 
(2002) 37/806 (which concerned prohibitions on the ownership or control by an 
undertaking ownership of more than one club and, like Meca-Medina, had been 
heard by the competition authorities after CAS had disposed it). It is curious that the 
CFI ever felt it necessary to depart from the Wouters formula given its previous use 
of this judgment in sports/competition cases, but the ground-breaking aspect of 
Meca-Medina lay not so much in its application of Wouters but in the implications of 
its application to doping rules specifically. 
Wouters did not concern sport at all, but as Weatherill (2006, p.650) argues, it 
is “of profound importance to the future treatment of sport under EC competition law” 
because its broad analysis of what is now Article 101 TFEU is capable of application 
to any future disputes between the sporting field and the competition regime. While it 
definitively rejects the idea that the ‘purely sporting interest’ approach could be 
applicable in the competition law context, Wouters is not a panacea because it 
introduces to the sports cases a concept of ‘inherency’ which has the potential to 
simply be a ‘rule of purely sporting interest’ in a different guise. The case concerned 
the compatibility with the European competition law regime of a Dutch law which 
prohibited multi-disciplinary partnerships between barristers and accountants. The 
Dutch legal profession had adopted and endorsed the law (which came within the 
ambit of Article 81(1) because it had the effect of restricting or distorting competition) 
and the legal profession fell within the definition of an ‘undertaking’ for the purposes 
of an orthodox competition law analysis – hence the prima facie breach of 
competition law. By prohibiting multi-disciplinary partnerships the undertaking had 
implemented a rule which was contrary to competition law, and had clearly done so 
in the context of economic activity. However, this did not necessarily mean the 
undertaking had used its powers unlawfully because the ECJ was required to have 
regard to “the overall context in which the decision of the association of undertakings 
was taken or produces its effects. More particularly, account must be taken of its 
objectives…It has then to be considered whether the consequential effects restrictive 
of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives” (Wouters v ARNOA 
[2002] ECR I-1577, para 97). The ECJ thus took what may be regarded as a ‘rule of 
reason’ approach (although defining it as such carries a health warning because “in 
Community competition law, the Court of Justice has rejected attempts to introduce 
(a ‘rule of reason’ test) since Consten and Grundig [1966 E.C.R. 429]” (Parrish and 
Miettinen, 2008, p.121)). But however one might define it, the Wouters approach 
requires a considered “evaluation” (to quote Bosman at p. 268) of the provision – 
with the effect that even if a measure was unlawful on its face, it might be ‘rescued’ if 
consideration of the justifications offered for its existence revealed it to be a 
proportionate and considered response to a legitimate concern.  
After evaluating the impact of the Dutch law and considering the legitimacy of 
the legal profession’s rationale for introducing it (namely, to help ensure the 
independence of the legal profession for the benefit of its clients), the European 
Court advised that the Regulation was justifiable because that outcome was in the 
wider interest. Similarly, the operation of sporting rules which can impact adversely 
on the interests of individuals can still have a justifiable objective when they are 
viewed in the broader context. Doping rules’ detrimental effect on the interests of 
athletes who fall foul of anti-doping regimes are clearly significant, but on this 
occasion they were countermanded by the governing bodies’ pursuit of what the 
Court accepted as the legitimate objective of ensuring drug-free competition. This 
analysis facilitates a move away from the sporting rule/economic rule distinction that 
was spawned by the ECJ in its earlier sports-related jurisprudence and embraced by 
the CFI in Meca-Medina, and because once one gets beyond the ‘jumpers for 
goalposts’ level of participation almost all sporting rules will also have an economic 
impact it will be almost impossible to argue that there is no economic element to any 
dispute which is deemed so significant as to merit an application the courts. 
This does not mean that all doping rules will be automatically acceptable, 
however. They could be condemned either because the ‘cut-off point’ in respect of 
particular substances is unjustifiable or because the penalties for a breach are 
inappropriate, and a straightforward application of Wouters would have involved a 
consideration of whether the rules were appropriate and proportionate bearing in 
mind the wider context. However, in an attempt to give effect to the Wouters concept 
of ‘inherency’ in the sporting context the ECJ in Meca-Medina advised (at para 45) 
that “even if the anti-doping rules at issue are to be regarded as a decision of an 
association of undertakings limiting the appellants' freedom of action, they do not, for 
all that, necessarily constitute a restriction of competition incompatible with the 
common market, within the meaning of Article 81 EC, since they are justified by a 
legitimate objective. Such a limitation is inherent in the organisation and proper 
conduct of competitive sport and its very purpose is to ensure healthy rivalry 
between athletes” (paras 49-55). It has been suggested that through this approach 
“the Court transposed the ‘inherency’ criterion from Deliege (a free movement case) 
to EC competition law, despite formally rejecting any convergence” (Parrish and 
Miettinen, 2008, p. 234) and facilitating the transposition of the inherency principle in 
this way would be an immensely significant development because it seems rules 
which were regarded as ‘inherent’ would not then need to be objectively examined. 
 If that state of affairs were to hold sway ‘inherency’ would indeed be the new 
‘purely sporting’ rule (Parrish and Miettinen, 2008, p. 237). The Court opined that 
doping rules had as their primary purpose the preservation of competition and the 
protection of athletes’ health and it is upon those grounds that their existence can be 
justified notwithstanding the competition concerns, but it is difficult to discern a 
rationale for the argument that doping rules are somehow ‘inherent’ in sports 
practices: sports were organised and practised without doping rules for hundreds of 
years and there are plenty of sports, and plenty of countries, that do little more than 
pay lip service (if that) to the doping rules now in existence.  
Doping rules are thus a reflection of sports’ responses to changing sporting 
landscapes and the availability of new technology. They facilitate WADA’s, national 
anti-doping agencies’ and sports bodies’ carrying out of the functions they have 
accrued unto themselves, so in that sense they are an invaluable tool in what is 
widely regarded as the legitimate aim of ensuring drug-free competition. But they are 
not ‘inherent’ in the sense of (for instance) the offside rule in football or the LBW rule 
in cricket. It would be regrettable if ‘inherency’ did indeed become the new ‘purely 
sporting’ rule, and it would be particularly dangerous if sports bodies, seduced by the 
‘inherency’ concept, were to proceed on the assumption that their doping rules would 
be regarded as ‘inherent’ and thus immune from scrutiny. A sporting rule can only be 
‘inherent’ ifs it has withstood the test of time and is fundamental to the sport, and by 
definition any rule which has an economic element will have been a comparatively 
recent response to the changing economic landscape. The Wouters approach, 
without ‘inherency’ would be perfectly appropriate for reconciling sports’ legitimate 
interests with their legal obligations and needs no embellishment because 
competition law will not render an appropriate, proportionate doping regime unlawful. 
Anti-doping rules can impose a burden on the athletes’ opportunities to compete, but 
one cannot discern from the Meca-Medina judgment any indication that the court 
was ever minded to hold that these particular rules went beyond what was necessary 
to advance the legitimate goal of drug-free sport. Weatherill (2006, p.651) points out 
that “the ECJ did not seek to attribute special magic to sporting rules” in Meca-
Medina and it would be regrettable if sports bodies sought to hide their rules behind 
the cloak of ‘inherency’ rather than engage in a proper, considered scrutiny of their 
rules and the rationale for them. It is clear from Meca-Medina that the courts will not 
look too hard for opportunities to substitute their understanding of the scientific and 
technical aspects for those of the experts: “the approach adopted in Meca-Medina is 
to accept the vast majority of rules adopted by a sporting federation in order to 
regulate its competitions exert an economic impact, but to appreciate that this does 
not of itself mean that they will be incompatible with EC law” (op cit). But in respect 
of rules that have the potential to be so important that an athlete (or other 
stakeholder) whose interests are ill-served by it might initiate legal proceedings, the 
governing body needs to think carefully about how it would be able show how it 
contributed the proper regulation of its sport and that any sanctions were 
proportionate to those legitimate aims.  
Meca-Medina extinguishes the argument used by sporting bodies in previous 
cases that certain rules are exempt from Community law because they have a 
‘purely sporting’ nature, but because the focus was on the application of competition 
law “the original exception (in the context of the free movement provisions, as in 
Walrave) has yet to be expressly overruled” (Parrish and Miettinen, 2008, p.105). 
Accordingly, this case does not have the competence to extinguish the existing 
exception in the free movement field - “in this sense, Meca-Medina is not in itself 
sufficient authority for the proposition that the Walrave sporting exception has also 
ceased to exist in the context of free movement” (Parrish and Miettinen, 2008, p.99). 
But it is now for sporting bodies to explain that although their rules may seem 
restrictive or unfair, they are nonetheless necessary. Weatherill (2006, p.657) argues 
that “as Meca-Medina shows, there remains scope for sport to protect its right to 
assert internal expertise in taking decisions that have both sporting and economic 
implications. The ECJ has collapsed the idea that there are purely sporting practices 
unaffected by EC law despite their economic effect, but it has not refused to accept 
that sport is special.” 
 
Is Meca-Medina ‘bad for sport’? 
 
Weatherill’s comments serve as an endorsement of the ECJ’s approach to Meca-
Medina and they are reflected in wider academic opinion. However, there has been 
considerable criticism from within the sporting community and many stakeholders 
would have much preferred the approach of the CFI, which would have given 
sporting organisations far more autonomy over their anti-doping regimes than the 
ECJ has done, even allowing for the ‘inherency’ argument which has the potential to 
lure European sporting organisations into a false sense of security. 
These concerns have been most prominently articulated by Gianni Infantino, 
now UEFA’s General Secretary and previously its much-respected Director of Legal 
Affairs. Infantino (2006, p.2) considers Meca-Medina to be “a major step backwards” 
which will inevitably open a “Pandora’s box” of highly undesirable legal and political 
ramifications. For sports bodies, the most problematic aspect of the case’s legacy is 
the confusion which surrounded the nature of the anti-doping rules; it is regrettable 
that the CFI’s approach was one that could not ever be reconciled with the Wouters 
formula and the ECJ was right to correct it; but this necessarily meant that the CFI 
and ECJ had reached conflicting decisions and the one which would have garnered 
most support within sporting organisations was not the one to ultimately hold sway. 
Infantino, recognising (as both the CFI and ECJ did) that the primary nature of the 
rules was sporting, contended that “if a sports rule is ‘non-economic’ in character, the 
Treaty (i.e. all of it) does not apply and that is the end of the matter.”  His analysis 
reflects the view of the CFI but, with respect, this is flawed reasoning. Whilst the 
economic nature of the doping rules is clearly secondary to their sporting context, 
one must nevertheless have due regard to the commercial realities of sport at the 
elite level. Manville (2008, p.21) reasons that “it would be incomprehensible that 
rules laid down by undertakings in a sector where billions upon billions of Euros are 
generated each year should be exempt from the scope of the Treaty” and it is the 
very fact of sport’s significance in so many social, economic, political and other ways 
that militates against arguments that it should be afforded special treatment. Clearly 
it has properties that render it ‘special’, but so do most other economic sectors and 
competition law is no less able to take them into account than it is able to 
accommodate the unique features of sports. 
Further criticism concerns the competence of the court itself, the allegation 
being that it has involved itself too deeply in anti-doping matters. As Infantino 
reasons, “with the greatest of respect to the judges in Luxembourg, do they really 
have the knowledge or expertise to decide whether it is one or two milligrams of 
nandrolone that should be permissible in the body tissue of a professional swimmer? 
And what on earth has this all got to do with European competition law?”  Clearly 
Infantino has a point, but the only solution to that conundrum is to give sports the 
blanket exemption from all aspects of European law which Infantino seeks, and that 
has simply not been on the EU’s agenda in the fifteen years since Bosman. One 
does not doubt that the judges of the CFI and ECJ would have wondered why on 
earth they were being burdened with the issues that arose in Meca-Medina, but the 
matter clearly fell within the courts’ jurisdiction and they had no choice but to deal 
with the issues raised. Judges are often required to consider issues which fall 
outside their areas of expertise – and, indeed, upon dismissing the complaint the 
Commission took the view that “it is not its job to take the place of sporting bodies 
when it comes to choosing the approach they feel is best suited to combating 
doping” (Commission Press Release, 2002) - but that is what judges are paid to do 
and they are intelligent people. The courts in Meca-Medina were quite capable of 
understanding the justifications for doping control that the sports bodies advanced 
and evaluating their arguments as to why the permissible level of nandrolone was 
what it was. Thereafter, the questions of whether that benchmark was appropriate, 
and whether the sanctions for exceeding it were proportionate, were questions that 
judges are eminently capable of answering. The courts cannot refuse jurisdiction 
simply because they have no knowledge of, or no interest in, the subject-matter of 
the dispute, but on this occasion they were sensitive to the peculiarities of the case 
and willing to defer to scientific opinion. It is for the anti-doping authorities to explain 
to a court why the permissible levels are where they are and why the length of ban is 
what it is, secure in the knowledge that the courts will not be keen to substitute their 
views for those of the experts.  
One can be more sympathetic towards Infantino’s argument that if the 
purpose of the Courts is to apply the law so as to create judgments suitable for 
application at national level and thereby ensure legal certainty, then this principle 
was departed from in Meca-Medina. He contends that “the Court of Justice has 
shown little interest in defining more clearly the scope of the sporting exception and 
has moved in the opposite direction in such a way that is likely to increase the scope 
for legal uncertainty and result in more competition law claims being levelled against 
sports bodies, often on spurious grounds that have little, if anything, to do with the 
functioning of economic competition in the European Union.” Likewise, FIFA was 
quick to express its disappointment at the incorporation of Meca-Medina in the White 
Paper on Sport 
(http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/federation/releases/newsid=550327.html), but why 
should a case-by-case approach be detrimental to the interests of sports at all? By 
analysing each case in turn, the courts are acknowledging and respecting the 
inherent peculiarities of each sport and, indeed, responding to the unique factors of 
each individual dispute. Sports organisations should be able to show that they carry 
out their role fairly, transparently, in accordance with lawful rules and without bias; it 
is right that doping rules - imposed by bodies which have wide-ranging monopoly 
powers and which receive massive sums from the public purse while being 
accountable to no-one but WADA - should be subject to the scrutiny of the courts, 
but those bodies also need the flexibility to respond appropriately to each new 
challenge as it arises. A legitimate response to the use of nandrolone will be different 
to that which is legitimate in respect of (say) blood doping (McArdle, 2011) or the 
whereabouts rule (Pendlebury and McGarry, 2010),  but neither the European courts 
nor the wider European Union is hostile to anti-doping regimes and if the anti-doping 
community can explain the merits of what it does and why, it will have nothing to 
fear. Meca-Medina strikes the balance between legal certainty and the need for 
flexibility. It is good for sport in general and for anti-doping in particular.   
  
Concluding thoughts 
 
Meca-Medina, as the ECJ’s first examination of the relationship between competition 
law and sport, is significant for its departure from the classic sporting jurisprudence 
in favour of the Wouters framework. This structure, by its very nature, demands 
analysis on a purely case-by-case basis but reflects the truism that most of the rules 
which Europe’s sporting bodies implement do have economic effects and are thus 
amenable to scrutiny by the competition authorities. But although they will be subject 
to scrutiny, they will not be subject to condemnation if sporting bodies can illustrate 
that the objectives pursued by its rules are legitimate and proportionate in their 
effects. As Weatherill (2008, Special Addendum, p.9) recognises, this accordingly 
means that the ECJ “did not offer answers to the many detailed questions raised 
about the scope of intervention of EC law into sporting practices,” but the courts can 
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only dispose of the case before it; to offer detailed answers to hypothetical scenarios 
or questions which are not germane to the case (as it was invited to do in Olympique 
Lyonnaise v Bernard [2010] All ER (EC) 615) would attract the criticism that they 
have overstepped their remit. Clearly the Meca-Medina approach does not facilitate 
the solid legal certainty which sporting bodies understandably seek; but European 
sports can afford able counsel who are qualified to provide guidance on whether 
particular rules are compatible with their Treaty obligations. Assistance on such 
matters could also be sought from the Commission in the form of the guidance 
letters that may be issued to facilitate compliance with Articles 101, 102 TFEU, 
subject to the caveat that it is ultimately for the courts, not the Commission, to rule 
on whether a particular course of action is compatible with European law.  
In keeping with the theme set by Meca-Medina and entrenched in the Lisbon 
Treaty, the Court in MOTOE v Greece [2008] 5 CMLR 11 confirmed that future 
questions regarding the growing relationship between sport and competition will be 
deliberated one case at a time: to quote the Advocate General’s Opinion (at para 38) 
“sport nowadays has a not insignificant economic dimension.1 Consequently, when it 
comes to the application of the competition rules, each individual activity that exhibits 
a connection with sport must on each occasion be examined to ascertain whether it 
is economic in nature or not.” Just as Meca-Medina provided clarification on the 
former Article 81’s connection with sport, MOTOE offers corresponding analysis in 
terms of what used to be Article 82 and Article 86 (and are now Articles 102, 106 
TFEU). In line with the ECJ’s reasoning in Meca-Medina, MOTOE treats sport not as 
a completely isolated, wholly-special sector where ‘purely sporting’ rules run 
rampant; rather, sport’s economic impact demands that it be treated in a manner 
similar to any other sector where economic activity brings it within the ambit of the 
competition law provisions, albeit while taking into account those factors that do 
indeed make sport ‘different’. Assessment on a case-by-case basis along the lines 
laid down in Wouters and subsequently developed in Meca-Medina and now 
MOTOE provides the Court with the opportunity to recognise the inherent 
peculiarities of particular sports; and particular sports are likewise provided with an 
opportunity to show how specific provisions or courses of conduct that may not have 
been appropriate in other circumstances are perfectly proper in theirs – as evinced 
by the fact that in MOTOE the monopoly undertaking had to change its activities to 
ensure compliance with competition law, while in Meca-Medina there had been no 
need to do so. In the latter, the anti-doping rules were deemed to be necessary and 
(more problematically) inherent in the proper functioning of swimming competitions, 
whereas the motorsport rules in MOTOE carried a strong potential for abuse, and it 
was that mere potential for abuse which rendered them contrary to competition law.  
None of this is straightforward, and sporting bodies could be forgiven for trying just to 
satisfy themselves that their doping (and other) rules could be regarded as ‘inherent’ 
in the organising and running of their sports and hope that no further scrutiny is 
required of them. That would be a risky game to play. A far better approach would be 
to not place all one’s eggs in the ‘inherency’ basket and to engage with Wouters, 
Meca-Medina and now MOTOE and consider whether the rules are necessary and 
proportionate – in effect, to partake in what Michael Beloff calls a “competition law 
compatibility audit” and thus have a strategy which can be offered as an alternative 
to the ‘inherency’ defence, should it fall on stony ground. Sports bodies which take 
those steps now, both in relation to their anti-doping provisions and to others with 
which competition law appears to arise, will have procedures that are far more likely 
to withstand legal scrutiny. Finally, it should also be mentioned in passing that he 
sporting provisions of the new Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
further reflect the Meca-Medina approach: although sporting bodies had championed 
the inclusion of a legal base of sport on the ground that it provide increased 
autonomy and a greater degree of certainty, the Community institutions’ obligation in 
Article 124 TFEU only to “tak[e] account of the specific nature of sport” enshrines the 
Meca-Medina approach rather than heralding anything more adventurous.  
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1 In MOTOE the Greek court asked the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on whether 
both the commercial and administrative activities of ELPA (a not-for-profit body which organised 
motor-racing events in Greece) fell within the scope of European competition law. If that question 
were answered in the affirmative, the Greek court also wished to know whether European competition 
laws rendered unlawful national measures which had given ELPA decision-making powers, given that 
ELPA organised and hosted its own events which might be in competition with those organised by 
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MOTOE or any other rival motorsport organisation. The ECJ held that although ELPA’s powers to 
regulate Greek motorsport had been granted to it by the state, it was still subject to European 
competition law in respect of its economic activities such as the organisation and commercial 
exploitation of motorcycling events, even though it was not motivated by profit. The monopoly right 
conferred upon ELPA allowed it to grant or deny consent to others who wished to organise motorsport 
events, but it was also at liberty to organise and commercially exploit such events itself and it had the 
potential power to deny other organisers access to the motorsport ‘market’ without being subject to 
any restrictions, obligations or internal review mechanisms. ELPA’s commercial activities thus fell 
within the scope of European competition law even though those powers had been granted to it by the 
state. 
 
